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* * * 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to describe, explain, and assess the most significant 
legislative changes in international copyright law over the past ten years, with a 
particular focus on the roles of authors and artists, understood as the actual creators of 
copyrightable works.  My account is limited to those elements of copyright legislation 
that are generally perceived to have been enacted in response to the challenges posed by 
the emergence and the spread of digital technology and the deployment of global 
computer networks, in particular the Internet.  While there were several other changes in 
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statutory copyright law across the globe,
1
 these changes were confined to specific 
jurisdictions and dealt with issues that were not directly related to technological 
advances, which places them outside the context of the "digital millennium" for the 
purposes of this paper.  In view of the interdisciplinary nature of the conference for 
which this paper is written, I will take a rather broad and principled approach at the 
expense of the kind of detailed discussion that might be expected by a purely legal 
audience and that I have provided elsewhere.
2
 
 My analysis will proceed in three steps.  First, I will review the most important 
legal innovation of the past ten years, namely the legal protection against circumvention 
of technological measures, which was introduced on the international level in 1996 as a 
result of the adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).
3
  Second, I will provide a speculative 
assessment of the wave of legislative reforms triggered by these two treaties from the 
point of view of artists by examining both the impact artists had on these reforms and 
how these reforms affect current and future artistic practices.  Third, I will examine one 
of the concepts that underlies copyright legislation in the digital millennium, namely the 
idea that copyright is property.  In the balance of this paper, I hope to facilitate the 
interdisciplinary discourse at the intersection of digital art and modern copyright law. 
 
 
I.  COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 
 
 The most significant substantive
4
 innovation in international copyright law is the 
adoption of an international obligation to legally protect the use of technological 
measures employed by copyright owners to shield their works against unauthorized 
use.
5
  The rationale typically advanced for this legal innovation is that the position of 
copyright owners should be strengthened in view of the potentially devastating effects 
of online copyright infringement resulting from the technological ease of copying and 
                                                 
1
 Examples include the enactment of the United States Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), the Australian Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) 
Act 2000 (No. 159, 2000), and the new German Law Governing Copyright Contracts (Gesetz zur 
Stärkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern und ausübenden Künstlern vom 22. März 2002, 
BGBl. I, 1155). 
2
 See, e.g., Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Eigengebrauch oder Hehlerei? – Zum Herunterladen von Musik- und 
Filmdateien aus dem Internet, 53 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 
INTERNATIONAL [GRUR INT.] 278 (2004) (discussion of legal issues relating to the downloading of 
music and movie files from the Internet); Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Schutz gegen Umgehung technischer 
Massnahmen im Urheberrecht aus internationaler und rechtsvergleichender Perspektive, 54 GRUR 
INT. 1 (2005) (discussion of the legal issues arising from the protection of technical protection 
measures against circumvention). 
3
 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), adopted on December 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94, 35 
I.L.M. 65 (1997); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), adopted on December 20, 
1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). 
4
 There is also a very significant procedural innovation, namely the establishment of an effective 
dispute settlement mechanism that is widely used by the member states of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), April 15, 1994, Annex 1C to the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).  See 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of April 15, 1994, 
Annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1226 
(1994). 
5
 See Article 11 WCT and Article 18 WPPT.  These two treaties also introduced an obligation to 
protect the integrity of copyright management information in Article 12 WCT and Article 19 WPPT.  
Given the fact that these rules are not particularly controversial, I will limit my discussion to the 
protection of technical measures. 
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distributing copyrighted works over the Internet.  What was remarkable about the 
insertion of an obligation to protect technological measures into the WCT and the 
WPPT is the fact that this type of legal protection was new to everyone.  There were a 
few rather remote precursors for such protection relating to computer programs,
6
 digital 
audio tapes,
7
 and satellite signals,
8
 but no copyright statute contained similarly 
comprehensive rules calling for a general protection of technological measures.  While 
most, if not all, international treaties in the field of intellectual property codify or 
reiterate pre-existing minimum protection rules, the legal protection of technical 
measures in the WCT and the WPPT is a prime example of the strategic use of 
international institutions and international law to further special interests that face 
considerable opposition on the national level.
9
  It is no secret that the United States 
Government acted on behalf of select copyright industries when it asked for an 
international treaty that incorporated the legal protection of technological measures after 
its proposals for similar domestic legislation had been unsuccessful.
10
  In other words, 
the legal protection of technological measures is largely the result of an international 
enterprise spearheaded by the United States and supported by the European Union, both 
acting in the interest of select copyright industries.  The international adoption and 
subsequent national implementation of the legal protection of technological measures is 
also remarkable for another reason.  As the following analysis reveals, the legislative 
model underlying the WIPO Treaties was turned into its exact opposite during the 
implementation process.  While the WIPO Treaties relied on what may be called an 
enforcement model, the actual rules adopted in the United States and the European 
Union rely on a completely different understanding of the legal protection of 
technological measures and essentially rely on what may be called an expansionist 
model.  Understanding this difference is crucial to understanding the controversy 
associated with the legal innovation that is the protection of technological measures.  
Consequently, I will divide my account into an international adoption phase 
(enforcement model) and a national implementation phase (expansionist model). 
 
A. The International Adoption Phase – The Enforcement Model 
 
 The defining feature of the enforcement model is that the scope of the legal 
protection of technological measures and the scope of traditional copyright law is co-
                                                 
6
 See Article 7(1)(c) of Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of 
computer programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.  This provision, in turn, derived from the original version 
of § 296 of the U.K. Copyright Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (c. 48), which has since been 
modified to implement the legal protection of technical measures. 
7
 See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992), 
codified in part at 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (relating to the circumvention of the Serial Copy 
Management System). 
8
 See Article 1707 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); see also 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 553(a)(2), 605(e)(4). 
9
 On the increasing strategic use of international institutions to further specific corporate interests, see 
Silke von Lewinski, Amerika. Ein Wintermärchen, in FESTSCHRIFT ADOLF DIETZ 583 (Peter Ganea 
at al. eds., 2001); Silke von Lewinski, Rechtsangleichung auf bilateraler, regionaler und 
internationaler Ebene – ein Erfahrungsbericht, in FESTSCHRIFT WILHELM NORDEMANN 475-76 
(Ulrich Loewenheim ed., 2004). 
10
 See, e.g., Thomas C. Vinje, A Brave New World of Technical Protection Systems, 18 EUROPEAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW [EIPR] 431 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda 
at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 373-374, 429-430 (1997); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
128-29 (2001); WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP 91-94 (2004). 
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extensive.  This alignment between copyright and anti-circumvention rules can be 
traced back to its origins in a proposal presented by a U.S. task force in 1995. 
 
1. The White Paper Proposal 
 
 Shortly after his election in 1992, President Clinton established a task force – 
staffed with former copyright lobbyists for the music and computer industries
11
 – to 
devise a strategy for the American commercialization of the Internet.  The proposals of 
this task force were published in 1995 in what has come to be known as the "White 
Paper," which included a proposal for the introduction of rules designed to protect the 
use of technological measures by copyright owners.
12
  The proposal was based on the 
idea that online copyright infringement could be significantly reduced if copyright 
owners could lock their works by using encryption technology and if the tools necessary 
for the decryption of their works were outlawed, so that copyright owners would have 
full control over who copies their works and on what conditions.  Consequently, the 
White Paper proposed the adoption of the following rule: 
 
No person shall import, manufacture or distribute any device, product, 
or component incorporated into a device or product, or offer or 
perform any service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to 
avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without 
the authority of the copyright owner or the law, any process, 
treatment, mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the 
violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under 
section 106.
13
 
 
 What was characteristic about this proposal is that it was limited to the prohibition 
of circumvention devices and did not outlaw the actual act of circumvention.  
Furthermore, it tied the scope of the legal protection of technological measures to the 
scope of the underlying copyright by making sure that devices whose primary purpose 
or effect was to circumvent technical measures for legal purposes, such as fair use, 
would remain legal.  Although this is not entirely clear from the wording of the 
provision cited above, this is what the White Paper claimed, when it said that "the 
proposed legislation prohibits only those devices or products, the primary purpose or 
effect of which is to circumvent such systems without authority.  That authority may be 
granted by the copyright owner or by limitations on the copyright owner's rights under 
the Copyright Act" and that "if the circumvention device is primarily intended and used 
for legal purposes, such as fair use, the device would not violate the provision, because 
a device with such purposes and effects would fall under the 'authorized by law' 
exemption".
14
  While this proposal for domestic legislation did not become law,
15
 it 
became important during the international negotiations at the World Intellectual 
                                                 
11
 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COYPRIGHT 90 (2001). 
12
 See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) (hereinafter "White Paper"). 
13
 White Paper, Appendix 1, § 1201. 
14
 Id. at 231 (emphasis in original). 
15
 See, e.g., Thomas C. Vinje, The New WIPO Copyright Treaty – A Happy Result in Geneva, 19 EIPR 
230, 234 (1997). 
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Property Organization, because it was the United States which introduced the topic of 
technical protection measures during the preparatory expert committee meetings.
16
 
 
2. The Basic WIPO Proposal 
 
 The U.S. proposal was combined with similar European proposals in the "Basic 
Proposal" that formed the primary basis for the negotiations ultimately leading to the 
adoption of Article 11 WCT and Article 18 WPPT.
17
  Article 13(1) of the Basic 
Proposal read: 
 
Contracting Parties shall make unlawful the importation, manufacture 
or distribution of protection-defeating devices, or the offer or 
performance of any service having the same effect, by any person 
knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that the device or 
service will be used for, or in the course of, the exercise of rights 
provided under this Treaty that is not authorized by the rightholder or 
the law. 
 
 This provision carried over the two characteristics mentioned above for the U.S. 
proposal, namely (i) the focus on circumvention devices as opposed to the act of 
circumvention and (ii) the identity of the scope of the legal protection of technological 
measures and the underlying substantive copyright law.
18
  Following the objection of a 
number of countries that considered Article 13(1) of the Basic Proposal to be vague and 
potentially overbroad, the proposal championed by the United States and the European 
Union was replaced with an African proposal,
19
 which focused on the act of 
circumvention rather than on the technology used to circumvent technological measures 
and which continued to tie the legal protection of technological measures to the scope of 
substantive copyright law.
20
  This proposal was ultimately adopted, with two minor 
clerical amendments.
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 411 (1997); 
JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996, Article 11 WCT, Note 28 
(2002). 
17
 Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (August 30, 1996) (hereinafter "Basic Proposal"). 
18
 See Note 13.05 of the Chairman's Explanatory Notes accompanying the Basic Proposal 
("Contracting Parties may design the exact field of application of the provisions envisaged in this 
Article taking into consideration the need to avoid legislation that would impede lawful practices 
and the lawful use of subject matter that is in the public domain") (emphasis added); accord JÖRG 
REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996, Article 11 WCT, Note 6 (2002); 
but see Jane C. Ginsburg, Achieving Balance in International Copyright Law, 26 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 212 (2003). 
19
 See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/56 (December 12, 1996) (Proposal of the African Delegation). 
20
 On the background of the African proposal, see PETER WAND, TECHNISCHE SCHUTZMASSNAHMEN 
UND URHEBERRECHT 33-34 (2001). 
21
 MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET, Note 6.67 (2002). 
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3. The WIPO Treaties 
 
 Article 11 WCT
22
 now reads: 
 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the 
exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and 
that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by 
the authors concerned or permitted by law. 
 
 The wording of this rule makes it clear that the legal protection of technological 
measures is co-extensive with substantive copyright law.  In other words, if a certain act 
is legal under copyright, it is also legal to circumvent any technological measures that 
have been applied to the work in question.  More specifically, any limitations on the 
exclusive right of copyright owners that are recognized by the copyright statute trump 
any technological measures that these copyright owners may apply.  This result is no 
coincidence.  During the WIPO negotiations, the international community generally 
recognized that using technological measures to block the exercise of copyright 
limitations was undesirable.
23
  The substantive connection between copyright and the 
legal protection of technological measures is essential to Article 11 WCT and Article 18 
WPPT.  Consequently, there is a broad consensus on this issue,
24
 and the dispute in the 
literature is about whether contracting parties are allowed to alter this principle when 
implementing the WIPO Treaties.
25
  Regardless of this controversy in legal scholarship, 
it is important to understand that the international legal protection of technological 
measures under the WIPO Treaties (and under all preceding drafts) rests firmly on the 
principle that this novel type of protection does not expand the boundaries of copyright 
law and that copyright limitations, such as fair use in the United States or the private use 
exemption in Continental Europe, take precedence over any technological measures that 
                                                 
22
 Article 18 WPPT is virtually identical to Article 11 WCT and will not be further discussed in the 
remainder of this paper. 
23
 See Summary Minutes, Main Committee I, WIPO Doc CRNR/DC/102 (August 26, 1997), Notes 
518 (Korea), 519 (South Africa), 523 (Canada), 526 (Singapore), 529 (European Union), 535 
(England), 536 (Austria), 537 (Norway); see also MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND 
THE INTERNET, Note C11.23 (2002). 
24
 See, e.g., Thomas C. Vinje, Copyright Imperilled?, 21 EIPR 201 (1999); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Chronique des États-Unis, 179 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR [RIDA] 143, 151 
(1999); Kamiel Koelman, A Hard Nut to Crack – The Protection of Technological Measures, 22 
EIPR 272 (2000); PETER WAND, TECHNISCHE SCHUTZMASSNAHMEN UND URHEBERRECHT 44 
(2001); Thomas Hoeren, Access Right as a Postmodern Symbol of Copyright Deconstruction?, in 
ALAI 2001, at 349 (2002); JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996, 
Article 11 WCT, Note 28 (2002); Alexander Peukert, Technische Schutzmassnahmen, in HANDBUCH 
DES URHEBERRECHTS § 33, Note 14 (Ulrich Loewenheim ed., 2003). 
25
 The majority opinion is that the minimum protection rule derived from Article 19 of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, enables countries to expand protection for technological measures beyond 
the limits of substantive copyright law.  I have argued that the scope of substantive copyright 
protection is the limit of how far the legal protection of technological measures can be expanded, 
otherwise one of the purposes of Article 11 WCT and Article 18 WPPT, namely the protection of 
third parties against the abuse of technological measures, would be defeated; see Cyrill P. 
Rigamonti, Schutz gegen Umgehung technischer Massnahmen im Urheberrecht aus internationaler 
und rechtsvergleichender Perspektive, 54 GRUR INT. 1, 5-7 (2005). 
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copyright owners might employ to protect their works.  In short, if it is legal to copy, it 
is legal to circumvent. 
 
4. The Concept of the Enforcement Model 
 
 Conceptually, the international rule incorporates what may be called the 
"enforcement model" of anti-circumvention protection, which relies on the 
understanding that the challenge posed by digital technology and the Internet is not the 
scope of copyright, but its enforcement.
26
  Indeed, the unauthorized distribution of 
copyrighted works over the Internet, such as the posting of the contents of a book on a 
Web site, was already illegal in most, if not all, countries prior to the adoption of the 
WIPO Treaties.  Accordingly, it was clear that if the enforcement of copyright 
infringement was the problem, then a further expansion of copyright protection could 
not be the solution.  If Internet piracy was the issue, as the representatives of the 
copyright industries claimed,
27
 then it was important to have an enforcement mechanism 
that would make copyright infringement impossible.  Technological protection 
measures held the promise of being such a mechanism, but it was obvious that the 
deployment of encryption-based online distribution networks for digital content could 
easily be undercut by technology companies selling software that would make it easy to 
decrypt encrypted digital works.  Outlawing the sale of these tools as envisioned in the 
draft bills mentioned above or at least outlawing the act of circumvention as provided 
by the WIPO Treaties seemed to be the way to go.  Therefore, the international legal 
protection of technological measures was not designed to expand copyright 
entitlements, but simply to reinforce pre-existing copyright entitlements by making sure 
that the envisioned technological delivery systems would remain sufficiently secure "to 
keep honest people honest."
28
  However, by the time the WIPO Treaties reached the 
level of domestic implementation, the enforcement model of technological measures no 
longer seemed to go far enough for the copyright industries, and they lobbied for the 
adoption of a different model during the national phase, a model that required the 
further expansion of substantive copyright law. 
 
B. The National Implementation Phase – The Expansionist Model 
 
 If the United States and the European Union had followed the model incorporated 
in the WIPO Treaties, the insertion of legal protection of technological measures into 
American and European copyright law would have hardly been controversial.  
However, as if the framework spelled out in Article 11 WCT and Article 18 WPPT did 
not exist, both the United States and the European Union departed from this model by 
resurrecting and modifying their respective digital agendas as they existed prior to the 
adoption of the WIPO Treaties.
29
  The enforcement model was replaced by what may be 
                                                 
26
 This has long been recognized as the primary problem posed by the Internet; see, e.g., Reto M. 
Hilty, Der Information Highway – eine Einführung in die Problematik, in INFORMATION HIGHWAY 
38 (Reto M. Hilty ed., 1996). 
27
 See, e.g., NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995, Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcommittee 
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 22 (1996) 
(statement of Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Association of America). 
28
 Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures – The Intersection of 
Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, 22 EIPR 198, 199 (2000). 
29
 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 134 (2001) (for the United States); Jörg Reinbothe, Die 
EG-Richtlinie zum Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft, 50 GRUR INT. 741 (2001) (for the 
European Union). 
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called the expansionist model, because the legal protection of technological measures 
was no longer considered an enforcement mechanism to curb online copyright 
infringement, but rather a means for further expanding substantive copyright protection. 
 
1. Difficulties with the Enforcement Model 
 
 The impetus for the conceptual change towards the expansionist model stemmed 
from the fact that the copyright industries had realized that copyright reform in the 
digital age was not about reducing Internet piracy, but about increasing control over the 
use of their works by private individuals,
30
 in spite the fact the entertainment industry 
kept voicing its concerns in terms of piracy, a rhetoric that tends to resonate well with 
policy-makers.
31
  To the extent that the spread of digital technology and high speed 
Internet access had enabled direct creator-to-consumer distribution of digital works at 
the expense of traditional intermediaries selling physical carriers of digital content, it 
became more and more clear that unless the copyright industries could strengthen their 
control over private copying, the very existence of their power base and ultimately of 
their commercial livelihood was at stake.  However, since traditional copyright law 
accommodated a number of limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners, most notably the fair use doctrine in the United States and the private 
use exemption in Continental Europe, copyright law did not bestow any exclusivity on 
copyright owners in the field of private copying.  Technological measures could provide 
factual exclusivity in the absence of legal exclusivity, but technological systems were 
vulnerable to circumvention.  The approach taken in the WIPO Treaties did not remedy 
this problem, precisely because it tied the scope of the legal protection of technological 
measures to the scope of substantive copyright law and because it placed the focus on 
the act of circumvention as opposed to circumvention technology.  As a result, under the 
WIPO regime, it would be perfectly legal to circumvent technological protection 
measures without authority from the copyright holders if the purpose underlying the 
circumvention was to make a copy that was legal under the fair use doctrine, the private 
use exemption, or some other copyright limitation.  Furthermore, the distribution of 
circumvention technology and the performance of circumvention services would also be 
legal for this purpose. 
 In this respect, the copyright owner's desire to fully control private copying by 
controlling circumvention technology bumped up against the Betamax decision
32
, 
according to which copying technology was legal as long as it had substantial 
noninfringing uses, even if it could be and was sometimes used for infringing purposes.  
Under this rule, the copyright owner's ability to establish full control over private 
copying depends on successful collaboration with technology and software companies, 
as in the case of the establishment of the DVD standard that incorporates a copy 
                                                 
30
 See also Pamela Samuelson, DRM {and, or, vs.} the Law, 46 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 44 
(2003) ("The main goal of DRM mandates is not, as the industry often claims, to stop 'piracy' but to 
change consumer expectations"). 
31
 See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copyright Liability Limitation 
Act, Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 200 (1998) (statement of Hilary 
Rosen, Recording Industry Association of America); WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, 
Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection of the House Committee on Commerce, 105th Cong. 54-55 (1998) (statement of Steven J. 
Metalitz on behalf of the Motion Picture Association of America). 
32
 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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protection scheme.
33
  However, technology companies do not necessarily share the 
copyright owners' interest in full control of private copying, because the sale of their 
technology may actually be increased as a result of uncontrolled private copying.  In 
sum, implementing the copyright owners' vision of perfect control would have required 
a change of the fair use doctrine and the Betamax rule in the United States and of the 
private use exemption and traditional third party liability rules in Continental Europe, 
which was virtually impossible to achieve as a practical matter by solely amending 
traditional copyright law.
34
  The solution was to abandon the WIPO model and to push 
for an expansion of the legal protection of technological measures beyond the 
boundaries of traditional copyright law.  The idea was quite simple.  If digital works 
could be encrypted and if circumvention itself as well as the sale of circumvention 
technology were made illegal regardless of the purpose of the circumvention, then any 
statutory copyright limitation would be irrelevant, because copying would require 
circumvention, which would no longer be possible as a factual matter.  In other words, 
the legal protection of technological measures looked like a convenient way to change 
the balance of interests enshrined in the copyright statute by simply adding a second and 
more comprehensive layer of rules on top of the pre-existing rules, without formally 
changing those pre-existing rules.
35
  This is exactly what was done both in the United 
States and in the European Union. 
 
2. The American Approach 
 
 The United States introduced the legal protection of technological measures in 
1998 as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
36
  Its approach is 
characterized by three features.  First, the statute distinguishes between access controls 
and copy controls, whereas the prohibition of acts of circumvention is limited to access 
controls.
37
  Second, in addition to prohibiting the circumvention of access controls, it 
also outlaws "trafficking" in technology that enables the circumvention of access or 
copy controls.  There are separate provisions for access and copy controls,
38
 but they are 
virtually identical and – if combined and stripped of excess wording – would read 
something like this: 
 
No person shall traffic in any technology that (A) is primarily 
designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work or 
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner; (B) has only 
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent such measures; or (C) is marketed for use in 
circumventing such measures. 
 
                                                 
33
 See Bernhard Knies, DeCSS – oder: Spiel mir das Lied vom Code, 47 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- 
UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 286 (2003). 
34
 Whether the U.S. Supreme Court will modify the Betamax rule in its eagerly awaited decision in the 
peer-to-peer Grokster case remains to be seen.  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480 (U.S. Supreme Court, oral argument heard on March 29, 2005). 
35
 This second layer has also been called "paracopyright"; see Haimo Schack, Anti-Circumvention 
Measures and Restrictions in Licensing Contracts as Instruments for Preventing Competition and 
Fair Use, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 321, 324. 
36
 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
37
 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
38
 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), 1201(b)(1). 
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 Third, the statute provides for a few exceptions
39
 to the general prohibition of 
circumvention technology and the act of circumventing access controls, but these 
exceptions are formally separate from and substantively narrower than pre-existing 
copyright limitations.
40
  More importantly, there is no exception for fair use,
41
 which 
means that it is illegal to traffic in technology that is designed to circumvent 
technological measures in order to enable or facilitate the fair use of copyrighted works, 
even though fair use itself remains legal and despite the fact that the act of 
circumventing copy controls is also legal.  It has been pointed out many times that this 
approach carries the risk of undermining the fair use defense altogether, because once 
the technological protection of digital works becomes the norm, copying without 
circumventing will no longer be possible and fair use will become merely symbolic.  In 
sum, the DMCA expands the exclusive rights of copyright owners beyond the 
traditional boundaries of copyright law for works that are protected by technological 
measures, which is a clear departure from the enforcement model underlying the WIPO 
Treaties.  The same is true for the European Union's implementation of its obligations 
under Article 11 WCT and Article 18 WPPT. 
 
3. The European Approach 
 
 The European Union's Information Society Directive
42
 does not distinguish 
between access and copy controls
43
 and its rules do not apply to computer programs
44
 
and services based on conditional access.
45
  The basic rules prohibiting both the act of 
circumvention and circumvention technology are quite similar to the ones enacted under 
the DMCA.  For instance, the pertinent rule banning circumvention technology reads in 
part: 
 
                                                 
39
 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-(j).  The list of exceptions does not follow any coherent principle; see Thomas 
C. Vinje, Copyright Imperilled?, 21 EIPR  201, 205 (1999) ("Congress chose the approach of 
adopting an extremely broad prohibition, then granting an exception to any group powerful enough 
to lobby effectively for one.  The breadth of the exception also turned on lobbying power"). 
40
 The DMCA also establishes a continuous administrative review process to monitor the effect of the 
prohibition of circumventing access controls and to provide exceptions if appropriate; see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E).  Currently, there are four very narrowly tailored administrative exceptions; see 
37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2004).  For an argument that this mechanism might be unconstitutional, see 
Julie Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States – Will Fair Use Survive?, 
21 EIPR 238 (1999). 
41
 Deriving such limitation from 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1), which says that "[n]othing in this section 
shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, 
under this title", would theoretically be possible, but has been rejected at least implicitly by the 
courts on the grounds that Congress intended to enact a separate anti-circumvention regime.  See, 
e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 459 (2d Cir. 2001); Paramount Pictures Corp. 
v. 321 Studios, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 2023 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS 187-88 (2001); but see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy – 
What the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 539-40 
(1999). 
42
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001 O.J. 
(L 167) 10 (hereinafter "InfoSoc"). 
43
 Article 6(3) InfoSoc. 
44
 See Consideration No. 50 and Article 1(2)(a) InfoSoc; see also Article 7(1)(c) Computer Directive. 
45
 See Article 9 InfoSoc and Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access, 
1998 O.J. (L 320) 54. 
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Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the 
manufacture […] of devices […] or the provision of services which 
(a) are […] marketed for the purpose of circumvention of, or (b) have 
only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent, or (c) are primarily designed […] for the purpose of 
enabling or facilitating the circumvention of, any effective 
technological measures.
46
 
 
 In terms of the relationship between traditional copyright limitations and the legal 
protection of technological measures, the European Union establishes a rather complex 
regime that differentiates between different copyright limitations.  Two rules are 
particularly important in the context of the Internet.  First, with respect to "works or 
other subject-matter made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them",
47
 technological measures employed by copyright owners are 
absolutely protected, which means that they cannot be circumvented even if the purpose 
of the circumvention is to make a legal copy.  This rule has been criticized by most legal 
scholars.
48
  Second, the European Union leaves it to the discretion of the individual 
member states to determine whether or not the legal protection of technological 
measures trumps the private use exemption.
49
  Germany has chosen to adopt a rule that 
prohibits circumvention of technological measures applied to digital works even if the 
circumvention in question serves to exercise the private use exemption,
50
 which 
continues to be recognized in Germany.
51
  The prohibition of the circumvention of 
technological measures in cases in which private copying is legal under traditional 
copyright law is considered ineffective by some German scholars as a matter of 
constitutional
52
 and criminal
53
 law.  Furthermore, this discrepancy between the 
protection of technical measures and the private use exemption creates a series of 
intricate legal issues, because Germany, like other European countries, relies on a 
collective compensation system for private use that can only retain its legitimacy if 
consumers (who pay a levy on blank discs and on devices capable of copying that is 
meant to compensate authors for private copying) are still able to make private copies.  
                                                 
46
 Article 6(2) InfoSoc. 
47
 Article 6(4) InfoSoc.  According to Consideration No. 53 InfoSoc, the purpose of this rule is to 
"ensure a secure environment for the provision of interactive on-demand services". 
48
 See, e.g., Thomas C. Vinje, Should We Begin Digging Copyright's Grave, 22 EIPR 557 (2000); 
Alexander Peukert, Digital Rights Management und Urheberrecht, ARCHIV FÜR URHEBER- UND 
MEDIENRECHT [UFITA] 707-08 (2002); Axel Metzger & Till Kreutzer, Richtlinie zum Urheberrecht 
in der "Informationsgesellschaft", MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 140, 141 (2002); Jacques de 
Werra, The Legal System of Technological Protection Measures, in ALAI 2001, at 227 (2002); 
Séverine Dusollier, Exceptions and Technological Measures in the European Copyright Directive of 
2001 – An Empty Promise, 34 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
COMPETITION LAW [IIC] 74-75 (2003). 
49
 Article 6(4) InfoSoc. 
50
 See § 95b(1)(6)(a) of the German Copyright Act of 1965, as amended. 
51
 See § 53(1) of the German Copyright Act. 
52
 See Bernd Holznagel & Sandra Brüggemann, Das Digital Right Management nach dem ersten Korb 
der Urheberrechtsnovelle, MMR 767 (2003); see also Oliver Spieker, Bestehen zivilrechtliche 
Ansprüche bei Umgehung von Kopierschutz und beim Anbieten von Erzeugnissen zu dessen 
Umgehung?, 106 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 480 (2004); 
Alexander Peukert, Technische Schutzmassnahmen, in HANDBUCH DES URHEBERRECHTS § 36, 
Notes 11-12 (Ulrich Loewenheim ed., 2003). 
53
 See Tarek Abdallah et al., Die Reform des Urheberrechts – hat der Gesetzgeber das Strafrecht 
übersehen?, 48 ZUM 31 (2004). 
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In other words, the German rule carries with it a danger of double payment, once 
individually to the copyright owner employing technical measures, and once under the 
levy system.
54
  The German legislature has addressed, but not yet satisfactorily resolved 
these issues.
55
  In sum, the European Union has followed the United States in expanding 
the exclusive rights of copyright owners through the vehicle of the legal protection of 
technological measures. 
 
C. Result 
 
 The result of the substitution of the international enforcement model with an 
expansionist model is the increase of the copyright owners' legal control over copying 
beyond the control available to them under pre-existing copyright law.
56
  As such, the 
"millennium legislation" just described may be viewed as a doctrinally complex 
instance of the continuing expansion of the rights of copyright owners in duration, 
scope, and jurisdictional reach.
57
  This expansion has sometimes been described as a 
process of "propertization" in the sense of a progressive development of copyright 
towards an absolute property right.
58
  Indeed, the property rhetoric of preventing "theft" 
and "stealing" on the Internet has been a central element in the public discussion leading 
to the adoption of the legal protection of technological measures.  I will come back to 
the propriety of using a property analogy in copyright law after the following 
assessment of the effects of the legal protection of technological measures on artists and 
on artistic practices. 
 
 
II.  ARTISTS AND THE PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES 
 
 Assessing the actual effects of any piece of legislation is exceedingly complex and 
requires thorough empirical research of the kind that is rarely done by legal scholars.  
Nevertheless, it is not without merit to provide an overview of the range of plausible 
effects without any empirical claim as to the actual prevalence of any of these effects.  
After all, those affected by a particular piece of legislation often react to their 
perception of a particular change in law as opposed to the empirical effects that this 
change actually brings about.  Therefore, the following is an admittedly speculative 
assessment of the effects of the legal protection of technological protection measures 
and the concomitant expansion of copyright on artists and their practices in the digital 
                                                 
54
 See also Alexander Peukert, Neue Techniken und ihre Auswirkung auf die Erhebung und Verteilung 
gesetzlicher Vergütungsansprüche, 47 ZUM 1050 (2003); Thomas C. Vinje, Should We Begin 
Digging Copyright's Grave, 22 EIPR 555 (2000); Till Kreutzer, Herausforderungen an das System 
der Pauschalvergütungen nach den §§ 54, 54a UrhG, 47 ZUM 1043-44 (2003). 
55
 Essentially, the use of technological protection measures is to be taken into account when 
determining the amount of the levy to be paid to authors; see § 13(4) of the German Law on 
Collecting Societies ("Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz").  See also Article 5(2)(b) InfoSoc. 
56
 See also Haimo Schack, Anti-Circumvention Measures and Restrictions in Licensing Contracts as 
Instruments for Preventing Competition and Fair Use, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 321, 327 
("The trick was to prevent access where copyright, for good reason, only prevents unauthorized 
use"). 
57
 This theme is explored in more detail by William W. Fisher, Geistiges Eigentum – ein ausufernder 
Rechtsbereich, in EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265 (Hannes Siegrist & David 
Sugarman eds., 1999). 
58
 See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag – Mechanisms of Consent and 
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, 
Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997). 
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millennium.  The evaluation of the impact of the legal protection of technological 
measures on artists is complicated by the fact that artists often lack ownership of the 
copyright in their work, especially when the work is meant to be professionally 
marketed to the masses.  I will first illustrate this lack of ownership before evaluating 
the effect that the enactment of legal protection of technological measures has on artists. 
 
A. The Issue of Copyright Ownership 
 
 Copyright practice suggests that any ownership rights that authors may have by 
virtue of their creation are generally transferred to market intermediaries by contractual 
agreement, by statutory presumption, or as a result of some variant of the work made for 
hire doctrine.
59
  In other words, it is not the directors, but instead the motion picture 
studios, not the musicians and composers, but instead the sound recording companies, 
not the individual programmer, but instead the computer industry, and not the writers, 
but instead the publishers, who hold the copyright and, therefore, who stand to gain or 
lose the most when it comes to changing the copyright statutes.  The relationship 
between the motion picture industry and Hollywood film directors is a typical example 
of the pervasiveness of the aggregation of ownership rights into the hands of a few 
movie studios.  Whatever rights a director may be able to negotiate in terms of credits 
and salary,
60
 the universal rule is that the motion picture studios get the copyright, 
because directors are typically employed by the studios and their work falls under the 
work made for hire doctrine.
61
  The fact that copyright statutes worldwide grant initial 
ownership of copyrightable works to authors makes it seem like the protection of the 
market intermediaries is derivative, while in practice it is just the opposite.  The 
protection that artists or authors receive under this regime is derivative and contractual 
as opposed to original and statutory.  Therefore, it is no surprise that a brief review of 
the international legislative process that led to the adoption of an international 
obligation to legally protect technological measures reveals that artists did not play any 
role.  The legislative efforts were largely driven by lobbyists for the copyright 
industries, most notably the motion picture industry.
62
  As a practical matter, this means 
that the expansion of copyright protection is primarily to the benefit of the market 
intermediaries as opposed to the benefit of the artists, because the expansion of 
copyright protection serves the copyright owners and not the actual creators of 
copyrightable works.  In other words, only to the extent that artists and authors retain 
the copyright in their works and slip into the unfamiliar role of market intermediaries do 
they directly benefit from the expansionist legislation described above.  This is not to 
say that having copyright entitlements concentrated in the hands of the market 
intermediaries is undesirable or inefficient or harmful, it is simply to say that the 
standard picture that the law seems to project is at odds with the real state of affairs, 
                                                 
59
 See, e.g., the empirical study on academic publishing by Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Contracts, 
and the U.S. Professorate, in FESTSCHRIFT WILHELM NORDEMANN 711 (Ulrich Loewenheim ed., 
2004). 
60
 While the Directors Guild of America has a collective bargaining agreement with the motion picture 
studios and the production companies, an additional director services agreement is negotiated for 
each film. 
61
 See, e.g., Derivative Rights, Moral Rights, and Movie Filtering Technology, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 91 (2004) (prepared statement of Taylor Hackford, Directors Guild of 
America). 
62
 See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 410 (1997). 
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which must be taken into consideration when assessing the impact of the anticipated 
widespread deployment of technological protection measures on artists. 
 
B. The Effects of the Legal Protection of Technological Measures 
 
 The primary effect of the emergence and spread of digital technology and the 
Internet is certainly a significant reduction in the industrial costs of cultural production.  
This is the underlying background effect against which the legal protection of 
technological measures is to be evaluated.  In doing so, it is useful to distinguish 
between two different aspects, one artistic, the other commercial. 
 
1. The Artistic Dimension 
 
 In terms of artistic practices, the technological advancement just described holds 
the promise of resulting in increased creative activity and of drastically expanding 
access to creative material.  Easy access to works of art in digital format also carries the 
potential of generating new forms of art, such as movie or photo mashups, that 
deliberately draw upon pre-existing works whose digital nature makes them particularly 
susceptible to manipulation, modification, and incorporation into other works, but also 
to distortion and deformation.  These new art forms may be the product of human 
interaction with pre-existing works, but they may also result from the use of automated 
software to create new works of art.  In legal terms, these activities implicate the 
copyright owner's right to create derivative works and the artist's moral rights, both of 
which are outside of the scope of this paper, because the legal issues arising from 
altering works are already well-known
63
 and do not originate with the emergence of 
digital technology and the Internet.  In addition to facilitating the creation of derivative 
works, the democratization of access to digital works also tends to further a new form of 
collaboration that draws on the convening power and the geographical reach of the 
Internet and which is sometimes labeled as "peer production."
64
  The standard example 
for this mode of cultural production is the open source movement
65
 that relies on the 
collaboration of volunteers who dedicate some of their time to creating and improving a 
specific piece of software that is not proprietary, in the sense that the source code is laid 
open to the public to see, experiment with, and improve.
66
  In sum, the artistic 
dimension is probably best characterized as a potential for the increased collaborative 
creation of derivative works. 
 This potential may be undercut by the application of technological measures, 
especially if applied outside the boundaries of copyright law.  Artists are not just 
producers, but also consumers and users of digital works.  To the extent that access to 
these works is made impossible by technological measures or rendered unaffordable due 
to the financial conditions imposed for access to these works, the pool of works that 
may serve as artistic input for creators may be diminished.  If they cannot circumvent 
                                                 
63
 For a discussion of moral rights and modern technology, see, e.g., Guy Pessach, The Author's Moral 
Right of Integrity in Cyberspace, 34 IIC 240 (2003); Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights in the 
Digital Age, 16 INT'L REV. L. COMP. & TECH. 187 (2002). 
64
 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 
(2002). 
65
 See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR (rev. ed., 2001). 
66
 Open source should not to be confused with the public domain, because the copyright in the specific 
work is not dedicated to the public, but it is retained and used to ensure that the project remains 
open, typically by requiring users to republish the source code that derives from the original source 
as part of the open source license. 
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the technological measures in order to gain access to protected works for legitimate 
uses, such as fair, transformative, or private use, the legal protection of technological 
measures may be detrimental.  Some liken the tendency of extending the exclusivity of 
technological measures into the public domain and into areas in which the use of 
copyrighted works is legal without authorization from the copyright holder to the 
English enclosure movements of the early modern period and view it as a second 
enclosure movement that threatens the public domain and the creative process 
altogether.
67
  The harm for artists is seen in the potential reduction of cultural material 
that could be put to transformative uses, such as parodies, and in the disruptive effects 
that this may have on the long-standing artistic practice of sequential creation.  In other 
words, the expansion of copyright and the application of technological measures may 
disable or hinder some of the artistic practices that digital technology and the Internet 
enable or facilitate, in particular the collaborative creation of derivative works 
mentioned above.  The open source movement mentioned above and the application of 
its principle of openness to digital content in the form of the creative commons project
68
 
are activist reactions to these concerns that may alleviate, but not solve the problem, 
should the adoption of technological measures turn out to be as pervasive as the critics 
of technological measures fear. 
 
2. The Commercial Dimension 
 
 The commercial dimension is what the legal protection of technological measures 
is all about.  It is for the most part a reaction to the insight that the reduction of 
production and distribution costs for digital works has a potentially corrosive effect on 
the business models of a number of copyright industries, in particular the music 
industry.
69
  While the production of music required expensive equipment and an 
elaborate distribution network just a few years ago, professional sound recordings can 
now be produced with a laptop and free audio editing software and distributed to 
consumers directly over the Internet or through peer-to-peer networks.  To the extent 
that the traditional market intermediaries are bypassed during this process, the power 
grip that they currently exert over many artists may be reduced, although it still appears 
to be necessary to achieve commercial success for composers and performing artists to 
have a physical compact disc produced and marketed by the record companies.  It is 
unclear as of yet whether the role of market intermediaries will be significantly 
transformed in the near future or whether they will successfully adapt their business 
models to accommodate new technological opportunities.
70
  For the moment, the cost-
savings associated with digital technology and the convenient electronic delivery of 
                                                 
67
 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); for a critique of Boyle's approach, see Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths 
of the Law – The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2003). 
68
 http://creativecommons.org; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 763 
(2003). 
69
 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP 18-24 (2004). 
70
 One example for this shift is the iTunes online music store, which is based on a business model that 
is quite different from the traditional model of selling and distributing music.  However, it is run by 
a technology company, not by the record companies, which simply license parts of their repertoire 
for online distribution.  The iTunes business model relies heavily on the use of technological 
measures.  For details, see BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY, ITUNES – HOW 
COPYRIGHT, CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL MEDIA (rev. ed., June 
15, 2004). 
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works through the Internet have not yet triggered the tidal wave of change that some 
predicted ten years ago.
71
 
 Nevertheless, the copyright industries insist that increasing their control over the 
use of their works is necessary to enable and sustain viable business models from which 
artists can benefit.
72
  However, it is questionable whether artists will financially benefit 
from the increase in control brought about by the legal protection of technological 
measures,
73
 simply because, as explained above, artists typically do not own the 
copyright in their works, and even if they do, they may not have the financial means to 
implement technological protection measures.
74
  Therefore, to the extent that artists do 
not market their works on their own and to the extent that they do not derive a direct 
benefit from third-party marketing by the owners of the copyright in their works, they 
cannot avail themselves of the monetary advantages that are supposed to come with 
increased copyright protection through technological measures.  In other words, if the 
added benefit of technological measures is not passed on to the artists by the copyright 
holders in the form of increased revenue, the artists may not gain anything from the 
legal protection of technological measures after all.  This is why some scholars in the 
United States propose a complete overhaul of traditional copyright law by establishing 
an alternative compensation system,
75
 which is derived from Continental European levy 
systems established to collect revenue for the private use of copyrighted works by 
taxing the sale of blank recording media and copying equipment.
76
  The goal of these 
proposals is to keep the Internet free from technological measures, to increase access to 
digital works, and to ensure just compensation for artists.  However, given the fact that 
the implementation of these proposals would require significant amendments to the U.S. 
Copyright Act and that the European Commission is in favor of phasing out the existing 
European levy systems to the benefit of individual digital rights management systems,
77
 
it is unlikely that this ambitious plan will be adopted in the near future.  In the 
meantime, technological protection measures will be employed, but it is too early to 
determine conclusively whether, on balance, the legal protection of these measures will 
have any of the potentially negative effects on artists mentioned above.  It may well be 
that the new rules will be relegated to merely symbolic legislation if it turns out that 
technological protection measures do not bring the results that the copyright owners 
expect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED 2.03 (March 1994). 
72
 Interestingly, the current lack of legal protection of technological measures in Switzerland did not 
prevent Apple from expanding its iTunes music downloading service to Switzerland on May 10, 
2005; similarly, Sony launched its first downloading service in Switzerland on May 11, 2005; see 
TAGES-ANZEIGER No. 108 of May 11, 2005, page 12. 
73
 See also Reto M. Hilty, Urheberrecht im digitalen Dilemma, [2003] 2 MAXPLANCKFORSCHUNG 49, 
52. 
74
 See, e.g., Sandra Künzi, Was haben DRMS mit Interessenausgleich zu tun?, sic! 2004, 797. 
75
 WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP (2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial 
Use Levy to Allow Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2003); Jessica Litman, 
Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004). 
76
 See, e.g., §§ 54-54h of the German Copyright Act; Article 20 of the Swiss Copyright Act. 
77
 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT, DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (DRM) WORKSHOP 2 (April 
16, 2002). 
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III.  COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PROPERTY RHETORIC 
 
 The expansionist model of the legal protection of technological measures has been 
identified above as yet another step in the process of expanding copyright towards the 
ideal of an absolute property right.  Indeed, the enactment of the legal protection of 
technological measures was accompanied by a strong property rhetoric that was even 
expressly incorporated into the official text of the Information Society Directive that 
includes the following revealing reference to property: 
 
Any harmonisation of copyright and related rights must take as a basis 
a high level of protection, since such rights are crucial to intellectual 
creation. Their protection helps to ensure the maintenance and 
development of creativity in the interests of authors, performers, 
producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public at large. 
Intellectual property has therefore been recognised as an integral part 
of property.
78
 
 
 This reference to property is no coincidence, and it confirms the fact that using the 
term "property" to describe the exclusive rights of copyright owners is not just a matter 
of terminology.
79
  Indeed, the property rhetoric has historically been associated with a 
distinctly expansionist notion of copyright, and those interested in establishing or 
increasing copyright protection have time and again invoked the concept of property to 
justify their normative claims.  In other words, the use of the term property is anything 
but neutral in terms of how copyright law ought to be shaped.  Any interdisciplinary 
study must be aware of the fact that the property analogy stands for a particular 
normative vision of copyright law that is based on the idea that broader copyright 
entitlements are better and that absolute copyright entitlements are ideal.
80
  I have 
argued elsewhere
81
 that the property rhetoric is neither necessary nor useful in copyright 
law, and I will limit myself here, first, to illustrating the point that the property analogy 
has had significant legal consequences in the past and, second, to suggesting that 
copyright should instead be conceptualized as a bundle of exclusive marketing rights. 
 
A. The Fall and Rise of the Property Theory of Copyright 
 
 Although the use of the property analogy is a global phenomenon both in the past 
and in the present,
82
 German law probably best illustrates the fact that the property 
rhetoric may have real legal consequences, for two reasons.  First, while the term 
property was widely used in Germany in the 18th and the early 19th centuries to 
                                                 
78
 Consideration No. 9 InfoSoc (emphasis added). 
79
 See also Mark Rose, Copyright and Its Metaphors, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) ("Metaphors are 
not just ornamental; they structure the way we think about matters and they have consequences"). 
80
 The reliance on notions of property has turned out to be particularly treacherous for the economic 
analysis of law, as some economists have been tempted to apply the rich body of economic literature 
on (real) property to copyright as "intellectual" property, thereby neglecting the fundamental 
differences of the economic goods in question.  For a recent critique of this literature, see Mark A. 
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
81
 See CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, GEISTIGES EIGENTUM ALS BEGRIFF UND THEORIE DES URHEBERRECHTS 
(2001). 
82
 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP 134-35 (2004).  Note that the term "intellectual 
property" is also on the rise in American court opinions and in American legal and economic 
scholarship; a good example is Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990). 
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describe copyright,
83
 it had been virtually eliminated from legal scholarship by the end 
of the 19th century, which makes it even more remarkable that it was reintroduced into 
German legal discourse after World War II.  Second, the property analogy was not just 
used by those interested in expanding copyright protection, but it was adopted by the 
German Constitutional Court in two decisions that declared two statutory copyright 
limitations to be unconstitutional.  In the following, I will briefly discuss both the fall 
and the subsequent rise of the property theory in German law. 
 
1. The Elimination of Property from Copyright Law in the 19th Century 
 
 The reason why both the term "property" and "intellectual property" were 
considered inappropriate for copyright towards the end of the 19th century is that 
property was reserved for ownership rights in tangible things
84
 and that the substantive 
rules governing real property were deemed inadequate for rights in intangible objects 
such as works of art, even by those who continued to use the term intellectual 
property.
85
  For the vast majority of lawyers, it was clear that only laymen could use the 
term "property" to include copyright entitlements or any other rights whose object was 
not a "res corporalis."
86
  A good example of the strong opposition to the term "property" 
(and of the substantive importance of using a particular legal category) is the behavior 
of the German delegation during the 1885 negotiations of the most important 
international copyright treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works.
87
  The originally proposed title of the Convention focused on the 
protection of the rights of authors ("protection des droits d'auteurs").  However, the 
French delegation suggested that the title be changed to include the protection of literary 
and artistic property ("protection de la propriété littéraire et artistique"), because the 
term "droits d'auteur" (author's rights) was not as widely accepted in France as the term 
"Urheberrecht" (author's right) in Germany, and since the Convention was drafted in 
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French, the French version should prevail.
88
  The German delegation objected to this 
proposal, insisting on the original title and stating that Germany could not accept the 
French proposal, "given the consequences that legal science would draw from the term 
property."
89
  The Germans ultimately lost a vote on this issue by 5 to 7.
90
  They then 
declared that this decision would most probably prevent Germany from joining the 
Berne Convention, because Germany could not accept a term that was incorrect in view 
of its domestic legal system.
91
  The Swiss delegation subsequently proposed a 
compromise consisting of replacing the original expression "protection des droits 
d'auteur" (protection of author's rights) with the alternative "protection des œuvres 
littéraires et artistiques" (protection of literary and artistic works).
92
  This compromise 
was ultimately adopted.  This is a powerful example of the strength of the objection to 
the term "property" in German legal science, considering that Germany preferred to 
walk away from an important international treaty rather than accept a title which 
seemed inaccurate.  In any event, the idea of copyright as property had effectively been 
eliminated from the legal discourse, and it has since been considered self-evident that 
copyright is not property in the technical legal sense. 
 This becomes readily apparent if one examines the application of property notions 
such as "theft" or "stealing" to describe the act of copyright infringement, as is 
frequently done in U.S. copyright legislation, either in the text of the bill itself or as part 
of the explanation for the necessity of legislation.  The most recent example is the 
Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005
93
, which creates new criminal penalties 
for those who record motion pictures in movie theaters and establishes new civil and 
criminal causes of action for the willful distribution of pre-release works.  In view of 
this content, the Act's title is misleading in three ways.  First, it is not concerned with 
the rights of artists, but with new criminal penalties introduced in the interest of motion 
picture studios.  Second, it provides no means for actual prevention, but simply allows 
for punishment of certain acts deemed harmful to the motion picture studios as 
copyright owners after the acts have been committed.  Third, and most importantly in 
the context of this paper, it is not about theft, because those who engage in illegally 
recording or distributing copyrighted works, while committing copyright infringement, 
do not "steal" anything.  What is it that is stolen or taken away from the copyright 
owner if a work is illegally copied?  It cannot be the work itself, because the work is 
intangible and continues to exist when it is reproduced.  It also cannot be a particular 
embodiment of a work, because those who duplicate the work do not touch any 
embodiments, but simply create a second one, if the duplicate is fixed at all.  What is 
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taken away from the copyright owner is his or her exclusivity with respect to the 
marketing of the work in question,
94
 but it seems difficult to reconcile the loss of 
exclusivity in the marketplace with notions of theft and stealing, particularly in a society 
that values competition and that has been continuously increasing the reach of antitrust 
laws.  The point is simply to show that the use of property notions is inappropriate for 
copyright from a strictly legal perspective and has been for quite a while. 
 
2. The Reintroduction of the Property Theory in German Copyright Law 
 
a) The Modern Property Theory of Copyright 
 
 The modern property theory of copyright that emerged after World War II had 
little to do with the property theory that had been eliminated before.  It was no longer a 
doctrinal theory according to which the rules of (real) property should be applied to 
copyright as "intellectual" property.  The scholars who contributed to the modern 
property theory were fully aware of and generally agreed with the doctrinal critique that 
had led to the demise of the property theory during the 19th century.
95
  If they continued 
to use the term "property" to describe copyright entitlements, it was not because they 
confused real and intellectual property as a matter of doctrine, but because they were 
committed to advancing a particular normative vision of copyright law whose primary 
purpose is to maximize the protection of copyright owners by eliminating statutory 
limitations on a potentially absolute property right.  Initially, this theory was solidly 
grounded in natural law
96
 and was used to advocate for increased protection for authors 
during the discussions about the revision of German copyright law that ultimately led to 
the adoption of the German Copyright Act of 1965.  The basic argument of the new 
property theorists was that copyright legislation had to look to the law of real property 
when defining the rights of authors of copyrightable works.
97
  In other words, the 
German legislature was asked to treat authors, as a group, the same way it treated 
property owners,
98
 which implied the normative claim that authors had to be granted 
rights that were as absolute in their scope as real property rights.  Of course, the idea 
that real property rights are absolute in scope is itself a misperception, and the myth of 
absolute property rights has since been rightfully dispelled.
99
  Nevertheless, the claim 
that copyright should be an absolute property right and that the statutory expansion 
necessary to achieve this goal was inherently just, as an expression of natural property 
law, was a central theme during the revision of German copyright law and was, at least 
in part, an important factor in the significant increase of copyright protection brought 
about by the German Copyright Act of 1965.
100
  The new property theory of copyright 
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was later stripped of its natural law connotations and turned into a theory of positive 
constitutional law
101
 that found its basis in Article 14 of the German Constitution.
102
  
The new property theory was relied upon by the German Constitutional Court in two 
cases which challenged the constitutionality of two limitations contained in the German 
Copyright Act of 1965, which are perhaps the best example of the power of metaphors. 
 
b) The Property Theory in the German Constitutional Court 
 
 The first case
103
 involved a limitation on the author's copyright in the sense that it 
exempted from copyright infringement liability the reproduction and distribution of 
copyrightable works as part of a collective work that was exclusively designed for 
church or school use.
104
  The plaintiffs' principal argument was that this provision 
violated Article 14 of the German Constitution, because copyright was an absolute 
property right that was constitutionally protected and that could not be statutorily 
limited.  As a result, any statutory limitation would be unconstitutional, including the 
one challenged in the case at hand.  The Court first seemed to reject this claim when it 
explained that while copyright qualified as property under Article 14, there was no 
substantive constitutional concept of property that could be used to determine the 
specific boundaries of a property right, and that it was up to the legislature to define the 
content and limits of these rights.
105
  However, the Court then reasoned that the 
legislature was not entirely free in its legislative determinations, stated that the 
constitutionality of the challenged provision would turn on whether it was justified by 
the public good,
106
 and held that the provision was unconstitutional, because the authors 
did not receive any compensation and because there was no "increased public interest" 
in excluding such compensation.  In reaching this decision, the Court explicitly relied 
on comparisons between authors and other groups and deemed it "essential" that authors 
were the only ones – unlike editors, publishers, and printers – who were forced by 
statute to provide the result of their work to the public for educational purposes without 
compensation.
107
  In order to strike down the statutory limitation in question, the Court 
had to rely on a notion of property outside the copyright statute that was broader than 
statutory copyright, and it found that notion in the property theory of copyright.
108
  The 
hypothetical scope of this absolute property right could then be used as a baseline, and 
every statutory deviation from that baseline had to be justifiable by reference to an 
"increased public interest" in order to be constitutional.  It was precisely this type of 
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analysis that the Court again employed when deciding a second case
109
 involving a 
copyright limitation that exempted religious organizations from liability when publicly 
performing a work for noncommercial purposes.
110
  The Court again compared the 
scope of statutory copyright law with the potential scope of copyright as property under 
the Constitution
111
 and then held that the statutory limitation in question was 
unconstitutional to the extent that copyright owners were not compensated for the 
noncommercial public performances by religious institutions.  To be clear, the Court 
also went the other way in a number of other cases,
112
 but even in those cases, it applied 
roughly the same methodology of conjuring up a hypothetical scope of copyright as 
property that was broader than the sum of all statutory rights and limitations and of 
determining whether the limitation in question was justified by an "increased public 
interest."  Inherent in this methodology is the tendency to expand copyright towards an 
absolute property right and to justify this expansion by invoking the legitimacy of the 
protection of property.  This is what the current use of the term "property" to describe 
copyright entitlements is all about. 
 
B. Copyright Entitlements as Exclusive Marketing Rights 
 
 Instead of relying on notions of property, copyright entitlements are more 
accurately conceptualized as exclusive marketing rights.  This term is known to those 
interested in intellectual property law from international patent law, since it has been 
used to describe the set of rights that countries without effective patent protection for 
pharmaceutical patents need to provide during the transitional phase from no protection 
to patent protection under Article 70(9) of the TRIPS Agreement.  While the term is 
new and not yet established in mainstream intellectual property scholarship outside its 
narrow use in TRIPS, it captures the essence of intellectual property rights without 
carrying with it a series of descriptive or normative connotations that come with the 
modern property theory of copyright.  It is also historically accurate in that the initial 
goal of copyright law across the globe was to restrict competition between different 
market participants, traditionally between the first and any subsequent publishers of a 
particular book.  The publisher has been called "the merchant for the author,"
113
 and 
copyright is still essentially a law for merchants, regardless of the authorship rhetoric 
that is used in copyright statutes, court opinions, and scholarship.  If the expansion of 
copyright through the legal protection of technological measures described above were 
understood as an expansion of exclusive marketing rights, it would also be easier to 
grasp the potential effects of this development, because the focus would automatically 
be put on the role of market intermediaries as opposed to writers, directors, composers, 
and performing artists.  It is essential for any interdisciplinary work at the intersection 
of art and copyright to recognize that copyright law in practice is not as much about 
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rights of actual creators as it is about rights of market intermediaries, regardless of the 
language commonly used in copyright statutes. 
 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The preceding analysis has shown that the characteristic element of the global 
wave of "millennium legislation" is the establishment of a novel type of protection 
against the circumvention of technological measures taken by copyright owners to 
protect their works.  Despite the fact that the central international rules contained in the 
WCT and the WPPT tied the scope of the legal protection of technological measures to 
the scope of the underlying substantive copyright law, both the United States and the 
European Union turned this model upside down and used it to expand the exclusive 
rights of copyright owners, thereby contributing to the further "propertization" of 
copyright law.  While it is too early to assess the effects of these developments on 
artistic creativity, it is important to understand that neither copyright nor the legal 
protection of technological measures is driven by or enacted for artists, but rather for the 
commercial intermediaries that market the artists' works to consumers.
114
  What legal 
scholarship has to offer to the interdisciplinary discourse on art and copyright is the 
insight that the rhetoric employed in copyright law and copyright statutes may differ 
considerably from copyright law as it plays out in practice and that scholars in other 
fields should resist the temptation of conceptualizing copyright as property, unless they 
share the particular normative vision associated with the modern property theory of 
copyright. 
 
 
* * * 
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